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ABSTRACT 
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court delivered a landmark ruling in Upjohn Co. v. 
United States.  The decision made clear that the protections afforded by the attorney-
client privilege apply to internal corporate investigations.  This piece examines the fun-
damental tenets of Upjohn, discusses some recent challenges to the applicability of privilege 
to materials gathered during internal investigations, and considers the manner in which 
the international nature of modern internal investigations adds complexity and uncer-
tainty to the field. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  In 1981, the United States Supreme Court was asked to consider the applicability of the 
attorney-client privilege to a corporate internal investigation in the case of Upjohn Co. v. 
United States.2 The case stemmed from an internal investigation into questionable pay-
ments to foreign officials by employees of a pharmaceutical manufacturer.  As part of 
the internal investigation, the corporation distributed a questionnaire to its employees 
seeking relevant information regarding such payments.  The responses were then re-
viewed by the corporation’s General Counsel and outside attorneys.  Eventually, several 
governmental entities became involved in the matter, including the Internal Review 
Service, who was interested in the tax consequences of the payments.  As part of its in-
quiry, the IRS requested copies of the questionnaire responses provided to investigating 
counsel by Upjohn’s employees.  The company refused on the basis of the attorney-
client privilege and the matter was litigated to the Supreme Court.   
 
In reaching its decision in the case, the Supreme Court considered the lower court’s 
assertion that the privilege did not apply “[t]o the extent that the communications were 
made by officers and agents not responsible for directing Upjohn’s actions in response 
to legal advice . . . for the simple reason that the communications were not the ‘cli-
ent’s.’”3 In the lower court’s opinion, only those in the corporation’s “control group” 
were covered by the privilege.  In considering the matter, the Supreme Court rejected 
the “control group” approach, stating that the test “frustrates the very purpose of the 
privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees of 
the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation.”4 In ex-
plaining its decision, the Court reminded the parties of the historical purpose of the 
privilege.  
 
The attorney–client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential com-
munications known to the common law.  Its purpose is to encourage full and 
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote 
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.  
The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends 
and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed 
by the client.5   
 
Consistent with the spirit and purpose of this language, the Court concluded that the 			
2
  449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
3
  Id. at 388. 
4
  Id. at 392. 
5
  Id. at 389. 
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questionnaires were covered by the attorney-client privilege.   
 
The Upjohn decision made clear that the protections afforded by the attorney-client 
privilege apply to internal corporate investigations and interactions between investigat-
ing counsel and employees.  Nevertheless, challenges to the applicability of the privilege 
have continued as adversarial parties have sought to gain access to materials from these 
inquiries.  This piece examines three such examples and considers the lessons learned for 
corporations and their counsel in each. 
II. KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT 
 
   One of the most publicized cases regarding internal investigations and privilege in 
recent years is the Kellogg Brown & Root (“KBR”) matter in the District of Columbia.  
In the KBR case, a whistleblower argued that the corporation had defrauded the gov-
ernment related to military contracts in Iraq.6 During discovery, the whistleblower re-
quested documents regarding a prior internal investigation of the matter conducted by 
in-house counsel at the company. KBR refused, asserting that the investigation had been 
undertaken to obtain legal advice and, therefore, the materials sought were protected 
from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.7 In reviewing the matter, the district 
court concluded that the materials were not protected from disclosure because the de-
fendant had not shown that “the communication would not have been made ‘but for’ 
the fact that legal advice was sought.”8 According to the district court, “KBR fail[ed] to 
carry its burden to demonstrate that the attorney-client privilege applies to the COBC 
documents. Most importantly, the Court finds that the COBC investigations were un-
dertaken pursuant to regulatory law and corporate policy rather than for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice.”9 
 
In 2014, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia overturned the 
lower court ruling, concluding that the “same considerations that led the Court in 
Upjohn to uphold the corporation’s privilege claims apply here.”10 In reaching its deci-
sion, the appellate court offered important clarifications regarding the Upjohn decision.  
First, the court made clear that Upjohn “does not hold or imply that the involvement of 			
6
  In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. et al., 756 F.3d 754, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  Many of the cases discussed and 
referenced herein also include issues related to the work-product doctrine.  This article, however, will only 
focus on the cases as they related to the attorney-client privilege. 
7
  See id. 
8
  Id. 
9
  United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Company, 37 F.Supp.3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2014). 
10
  In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. et al., 756 F.3d at 757. 
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outside counsel is a necessary predicate for the privilege to apply.”11 Second, the court 
explained that “communications made by and to non-attorneys serving as agents of 
attorneys in internal investigations are routinely protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege.”12 Third, the court noted that Upjohn does not require a “company to use magic 
words to its employees in order to gain the benefit of the privilege for an internal inves-
tigation.”13  
 
The appellate court in the KBR case also rejected the lower court’s argument that the 
company’s internal investigation did not deserve privilege protection because it was the 
result of regulatory requirements and corporate policies.  The appellate court stated, “So 
long as obtaining or providing legal advice was one of the significant purposes of the 
internal investigation, the attorney-client privilege applies, even if there were also other 
purposes for the investigation and even if the investigation was mandated by regulation 
rather than simply an exercise of company discretion.”14 As part of this analysis, the 
appellate court rejected the lower court’s use of a “but for” test to determine if a com-
munication was properly protected by the attorney-client privilege.15 
 
[T]he District Court’s novel [“but for”] approach would eradicate the attorney-
client privilege for internal investigations conducted by businesses that are re-
quired by law to maintain compliance programs, which is now the case in a sig-
nificant swath of American industry.  In turn, businesses would be less likely to 
disclosure facts to their attorneys and to seek legal advice, which would “limit the 
valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client’s compliance with the 
law.” Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.16 
 
The appellate court concluded by determining that the district court “clearly erred.”17  
 
Despite the strong language from the appellate court in the KBR case, the plaintiffs in 
the matter continued to challenge the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.18 The 
matter eventually made its way to the United States Supreme Court, which denied the 			
11
  Id at 758. 
12
  Id. 
13
  Id. 
14
  Id. at 758-59.  As part of this analysis, the appellate court also rejected the lower court’s use of a “but for” test 
with regard to the purpose of the communication.  See id. at 759. 
15
  See id. at 759. 
16
  Id. at 759. 
17
  See id. at 760. 
18
  See Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. et al., 2015 WL 4727411 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2015). 
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plaintiff’s writ of certiorari in January 2016.19 The KBR matter is a strong signal that, 
despite Upjohn, investigating counsel must be prepared for potential litigation regarding 
the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to internal investigations. To this end, 
counsel must be vigilant in ensuring that the investigation and any subsequent disclo-
sures are made with a full understanding and appreciation of the risks of such challeng-
es. 
 
III. WAL-MART 
 
   Another internal investigation matter that has garnered recent attention is the dispute 
over the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to an internal investigation con-
ducted by Wal-Mart related to alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  
The matter began when the New York Times published a story in April 2012 regarding 
potential bribery by employees of Wal-Mart in Mexico.20 The article included allega-
tions that Wal-Mart executives had been aware of the conduct since 2005, and failed to 
adequately respond.21 In particular, the article alleged that Wal-Mart had conducted an 
ineffective internal investigation, allowing the same general counsel of Wal-Mart de 
Mexico who was implicated in the scandal to lead the inquiry.22 In June 2012, the Indi-
ana Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund IBEW (“IBEW”), a Wal-Mart shareholder, 
contacted the company and requested access to documents related to the company’s 
investigation of the bribery allegations.23 Wal-Mart provided some materials, but de-
clined to provide documents that that they argued were protected by privilege or not 
necessary and essential to the trust fund’s inquiry.24 The issue eventually moved into the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, which ordered Wal-Mart to produce the documents un-
der what is known as the Garner doctrine.25 The matter was then appealed to the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, which also focused on the Garner doctrine to determine whether 
the plaintiffs were entitled to the materials.26 			
19
  See United States ex rel. Barko v. Kellogg Brown & Root, et al., U.S., No. 15-589, cert. denied (Jan. 16, 2016). 
20
  See David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level Struggle, New 
York Times (April 21, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-
mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
21
  See id. 
22
  See id. 
23
  See Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Indiana Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund IBEW, 95 A.3d 1264, 1268-69 
(Del. 2014) 
24
  See id. at 1269. 
25
  See id. at 1270 (citing Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
26
  See id. 
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The Garner doctrine “allows stockholders of a corporation to invade the corporation’s 
attorney-client privilege in order to prove fiduciary breaches by those in control of the 
corporation upon showing good cause.”27 In determining whether good cause exists, the 
Garner court established a number of factors for consideration.  
 
There are many indicia that may contribute to a decision of presence or absence of good 
cause, among them the number of shareholders and the percentage of stock they repre-
sent; the bona fides of the shareholders; the nature of the shareholders’ claim and 
whether it is obviously colorable; the apparent necessity or desirability of the sharehold-
ers having the information and the availability of it from other sources; whether, if the 
shareholders’ claim is of wrongful action by the corporation, it is of action criminal, or 
illegal but not criminal, or of doubtful legality; whether the communication is of advice 
concerning the litigation itself; the extent to which the communication is identified 
versus the extent to which the shareholders are blindly fishing; the risk of revelation of 
trade secrets or other information in whose confidentiality the corporation has an inter-
est for independent reasons.28 
 
In this matter, because the IBEW was a shareholder, much of the contention centered 
on the necessity of breaching the privilege to obtain the information sought.   
 
After reviewing the facts of the case and the Garner doctrine, the Delaware Supreme 
Court affirmed the lower court decision ordering Wal-Mart to produce the privileged 
materials.29 In reaching its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court noted the importance 
of the attorney-client privilege and stated, “[T]he Garner doctrine fiduciary exception 
to the attorney-client privilege is narrow, exacting, and intended to be very difficult to 
satisfy.”30 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s had satisfied this high bar.  
The conclusion was reached, in part, because the focus of the suit was on the internal 
			
27
  See id. at 1276. 
 The attorney-client privilege still has viability for the corporate client. The corporation is not barred from 
asserting it merely because those demanding information enjoy the status of stockholders. But where the 
corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges of acting inimically to stockholder interests, pro-
tection of those interests as well as those of the corporation and of the public require that the availability 
of the privilege be subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not be invoked in 
the particular instance. 
 Id. 
28
  Id. at 1276 n.32 (quoting Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104). 
29
  Id. at 1280. 
30
  Id. at 1278. 
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investigation itself, rather than the underlying bribery.31 This led the court to conclude 
that providing access to the privileged investigatory materials was necessary and essential 
to the IBEW’s claims.  As the lower court stated when considering the matter, “[W]here 
there is a colorable basis that part of the wrongdoing was in the way the investigation 
itself was conducted, I think it’s very difficult to find those documents by other 
means.”32   
 
As shareholder suits related to allegedly improper or inadequate internal investigations 
grow, counsel must be cognizant of the possibility that plaintiffs might attempt to over-
come privilege protections using the Garner doctrine.33 This should serve as a reminder 
to corporations of the importance of engaging independent outside counsel to conduct 
thorough and credible investigations when potential serious misconduct is discovered.34 
If the Wal-Mart investigation itself had not been at issue here, it is probable that the 
Garner exception to the privilege protection might not have been invoked and the mate-
rials might have remained protected from compelled disclosure.  
 
IV. BANK OF CHINA 
 
   The above cases demonstrate the increasing frequency with which challenges are being 
brought regarding the application of privilege to internal investigation materials. While 
the above cases center on the application of United States privilege law, the growing 
international nature of internal investigations means that foreign privilege laws are also 
of vital importance.  As noted in my 2011 article, International White Collar Crime and 
the Globalization of Internal Investigations, understanding how privilege laws vary by 
jurisdiction is imperative for investigating counsel.35 
 			
31
  See Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 95 A.3d at 1278 (“The record reflects that IBEW’s proper purposes sought infor-
mation regarding the handling of the WalMex Investigation, whether a cover-up took place, and what details 
were shared with the Wal-Mart Board.  The Court of Chancery explained that the documents IBEW sought 
under Garner ‘go to those issues.’”). 
32
  Id. at 1279.  
33
  See e.g. In re Lululemon Athletica Inc., 220 Litigation, C.A. No. 9039-VCP (April 30, 2015) (in which the 
Delaware Court of Chancery ordered the company to produce certain privileged documents to plaintiffs re-
lated to an investigation of potential insider trading). 
34
  See Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of Internal Investigations, 39 
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL 361 (2012); Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct in the Age of 
the Whistleblower: Foreseeing and Avoiding Hidden Dangers, 3 BLOOMBERG CORPORATE LAW JOURNAL 
670 (2008). 
35
  Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of Internal Investigations, 39 
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL 361 (2012). 
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[O]ne must be familiar with privilege laws in the jurisdictions, both regional and 
national, involved in an international internal investigation as the rules vary dra-
matically by country and subject matter.  While the different variations of privi-
lege can have a myriad of impacts on an internal inquiry, two will be mentioned 
here specifically.  First, the role of inhouse counsel, including a corporation’s gen-
eral counsel, must be closely examined.  While it is common for in-house counsel 
in the United States to perform a preliminary inquiry to determine whether out-
side counsel is required for a more extensive investigation, in some jurisdictions 
the materials and information collected during this initial appraisal of the situa-
tion might not be protected from compulsory disclosure. . . Second, counsel must 
be aware of the possibility that attorneys from one region of the globe might not 
enjoy any privilege protections in certain jurisdictions, even if they are independ-
ent outside counsel. . . While grappling with the difficulties presented by these 
divergent privilege rules is challenging, conducting an international internal in-
vestigation without consideration of their impact on the course and conduct of 
the inquiry could be fatal.36 
 
The potential ramifications for the existence of varying approaches to the attorney-
client privilege around the world is well illustrated by the Bank of China case.37  
 
The Bank of China case stems from the death of Daniel Wultz and the injuries suffered 
by Yekutiel Wultz in a 2006 suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, Israel.38 The attack was carried 
out by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”), an organization designated a terrorist group 
subject to economic sanctions.39 In response, the Wultz family filed suit against the bank 
and others in federal court in the United States, alleging, among other things, that the 
bank had provided material support to the PLI in violation of United States law.  Ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, the Bank of China failed to comply with the economic sanc-
tions against the PIJ and facilitated wire transfers for the organization that “were in-
strumental in helping the PIJ to plan and execute terrorist attacks.”40 During discovery 
in the matter, the plaintiffs sought documents from the Bank of China, including mate-
rials located in China and related to “anti-money laundering (“AML”) and compliance 
procedures and investigations.”41 The bank, however, refused to provide certain materi-
als, alleging they were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.  In 			
36
  Id. at 372-73. 
37
  See Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 304 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Wultz v. Bank of China ltd., 979 F. Supp. 
2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
38
  See Wultz, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 483. 
39
  See Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 811 F. Supp. 2d 841, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
40
  Id. 
41
  Wultz, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 484. 
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response, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel.  
In addressing the dispute, the court first determined which privilege law was applicable 
in the matter.  This was of vital significant because of distinctions between the privilege 
laws of the United States and China.  After examining choice of law precedent, the court 
concluded that some documents were government by Chinese law and others were gov-
erned by American law.42 With regard to the documents governed by Chinese law, the 
court quickly disposed of the issue by noting that Chinese law does not recognize the 
attorney-client privilege.43 As a result, the court ordered the bank to produce those ma-
terials government by Chinese law and dated prior to receipt of the plaintiff’s demand 
letter on January 28, 2008, which date marked the beginning of litigation in the case.44 
With regard to the documents government by American law, the court focused on 
whether the protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege should be extended to 
communications between employees of the company and members of the company’s 
Legal and Compliance Department in China. The plaintiffs argued that the company’s 
in-house counsel in China were “not required to have legal degrees or bar certificates” 
and, therefore, communications with them were not entitled to protection by the attor-
ney-client privilege.45 The Bank of China responded by arguing that the Chinese in-
house counsel were the “functional equivalent” of attorneys and were permitted to offer 
legal advice.46 The court agreed with the plaintiffs and concluded that the bank had 
failed to establish that the communications satisfied the requirements of the attorney-
client privilege.47 
 
The United Shoe principle justifies the protection of the attorney-client privilege 
for circumstances where a lawyer—whose authority derives from her position as a 			
42
  See id. at 489-92.  The court utilized a “touch base” analysis in determining which country’s privilege laws 
should apply.  This analysis asks which country “has the ‘predominant’ or ‘the most direct and compelling 
interest’ in whether those communications should remain confidential, unless that foreign law is contrary to 
the public policy of this forum.”  Id. at 486. 
43
  See id. at 492-93 (“BOC does not seriously contest the proposition that Chinese law does not include the 
attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine as understood in American law.”). 
44
  See id. at 492 (“U.S. privilege law applies to all documents created after January 28, 2008 that do in fact relate 
to the demand letter and the subject matter that gave rise to this lawsuit, because those documents pertain to 
American law “or the conduct of litigation in the United States.”). 
45
  Id. at 493. 
46
  See id. 
47
  See id. 
 Defendant has failed to carry its burden of establishing that the documents contain “communications (1) 
between a client and his or her attorney (2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) 
for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance, or attorneys' mental impressions, opinions or 
legal theories concerning specific litigation.” 
 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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member of the bar—is engaged to provide legal advice. While the Chinese legal 
system may be developing, the distinctions between lawyer and in-house counsel 
are clear and presumably exist for a good reason. I see no compelling reason to 
depart from the long-standing principle of United Shoe and create a “functional 
equivalency” test for the invocation of the attorney-client privilege when apply-
ing United States law. To the extent BOC has claimed privilege over communica-
tions from, to and among members of legal or other departments who are not li-
censed attorneys, the attorney-client privilege does not apply.48 
 
In concluding its discussion of the privilege issue, the court reminded the parties of the 
fundamental rule that “[p]rivilege does not apply to ‘an internal corporate investigation 
. . . made by management itself.’”49  
 
The Bank of China case is an important example of the complexities and potential pit-
falls that can result from the international and cross-border nature of modern internal 
corporate investigations.  The decision of the court in the Bank of China case to compel 
the disclosure of materials from the investigation makes clear that counsel must consider 
and react to varying global standards regarding the applicability of privilege when struc-
turing and conducting an investigation.  This includes understanding that privilege laws 
in foreign jurisdictions may determine the outcome of discovery disputes in not only 
foreign venues, but also in United States courts.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
   In 1981, the United States Supreme Court made clear in Upjohn that the protections 
afforded by the attorney-client privilege apply to internal corporate investigations.  Nev-
ertheless, the application of such privilege protections remains an evolving field as new 
challenges are brought and new complexities are introduced. As investigating counsel 
continue engaging in these matters, it remains vital that privilege considerations and 
changes in this area of law remain at the forefront of their minds as they both structure 
and conduct inquiries.   
 
			
48
  Id. at 495.  The quote refers to United States v. Shoe, 89 F. Supp. 357 (D.C. Mass. 1950). 
49
  Id. at 496; see also Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of Internal 
Investigations, 39 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL 361, 367-73 (2012) (discussing the importance of using 
legal counsel when conducting internal investigations). 
